Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
Department of Computer Science Technical
Reports

Department of Computer Science

2000

A Proactive Approach to Distributed DoS Prevention Using RouteBased Packet Filtering
Kihong Park
Purdue University, park@cs.purdue.edu

Heejo Lee

Report Number:
00-017

Park, Kihong and Lee, Heejo, "A Proactive Approach to Distributed DoS Prevention Using Route-Based
Packet Filtering" (2000). Department of Computer Science Technical Reports. Paper 1495.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cstech/1495

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries.
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information.

A PROACTIVE APPROACH TO DISTRIBUTED
PREVENTION USING ROUTEROUTE·
DoS ATTACK PREVENTION
BASED PACKET
PACKET FILTERING

Kihong
Kihong Park
Heejo
Heejo Lee

Department of Computer
Computer Sciences
Sciences
Purdue
Purdue University
University
West
West Lafayette,
Lafayette, IN
IN 47907
47907

CSD
#00-017
CSD TR #00-017
December
December 2000
2000

A
A Proactive Approach to Distributed DoS Attack Prevention
using Route-Based Packet Filtering*
Filtering*
Kihong Park
Heejo Leef
Lee t
Parktt
::.Jetwork
Setwo1.k Systems Lab
Department of
Sciences
of' Computer Scicilces
Purdue
Uniwrsity
I'urtlue Unil-ersitv
\Vest
47907
I S 37907
JJTestLafayette,
L a f a ~ e t t e .L\
{park,hlee}©:cs.purdue.edu
{ p a r k . h l e e ) Q c s . p ~ ~ r edu
d~~e
CSD-TR 00-017
December 3,
3: 2000

Abstract

Denial-of-service (DoS)
In this paper, we
(DoS) attack on the Internet has become a pressing problem. I11
describe,
describe. analyze
analyze and evaluate route-based distributed packet filtering ((DPF).
D P F ) . a nnovel
o ~ e lapproach tto
o
distributed DoS (DDoS)
relationship between
between
(DDoS) attack prevention. \Ve show tthat
h a t there is aan
n intimate relationsliip
the effectiveness
power-law network tol~ology.
topology. We
\Ve evaluate
effectiveness of DPF
D P F at
a t mitigating DDoS attacks and power-law
performance using Internet autonomous
autonoinous system and artificially generated topologies.
The
DPF
sa.lient features
features of this work are two-foid.
t~vo-fold. First. ,,-e
we show tthat
hat D
P F is able tto
o proactively
T h e salient
filter out a significant fraction of spoofed packet
pacltet flows
flows and prevent attack packets froill
from reaching their
their
filter
targets in the first
first place.
place. The
T h e IP flows
flo~vsthat cannot be proactively
targets
proactively curtailed are extremely sparse
such that
within a small.
small, constant number of
of
ca.n be localized-i.e.,
localized-i.e.. IP
I P traceback-to
tra.ceback-to a:it,l~in
t h a t their origin can
candidate sites.
performance effects can be achieved
sites. \Ve show that
t h a t the two proactive and reactive performance
filtering on less than 20% of lnt,ernet
Internet autonomous system (AS) sites.
by implementing route-based filtering
Second, we show that
t h a t the two complementary
complelnentary performance measures are dependent on the properSecond,
ties of the underlying AS graph topology. In particular. we
"..-e sho~v
show that the power-law
power-law structure of
of
AS topology leads to
t o connectivity properties which are crucial in facilitating the observed
Internet AS
performance effects.
-4s a DDoS prevention architecture,
architecture. DPF
D P F is able to emulate the IIP
P traceback pronjess
As
prowess of
of probaa.lleviating the latter's
la.tt,er's three principal lveaknesses:
bilistic packet marking, while alleviating
"..-eaknesses: (i)
(i) need to
to inscribe
information in the IP
I P packet
pacltet header,
header. (ii)
(ii) rea~t~ireness-tracebaclt
link information
reactiveness-traceback occurs after the impact
impact of
of
DoS attack has been felt-and
felt-and (iii)
(iii) scalability where t,he
o achieve IIP
P ti-aceback
DoS
the effort needed tto
traceback grows
\vit,h the number of attack hosts engaged in a DDoS attack.
proportionally with
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11 Introduction
1.1
1.1 Background
(DoS) is a pressing problem on the Internet as evidenced by recent attacks
at,t,acks on comcoinDenial of service (DoS)
mercial servers and ISPs and their consequent disruption
disruptioil of services [8].
[8]. DoS attacks [4.11.
[4. 11. 17.30]
1'7. 301

elements-e.g.. Vleb
Web servers,
servers, routers. firewalls.
fircwalls. and
aiid
consume resources associated with various network elements~e.g.,
end hosts~which
hosts-which impedes the efficient functioning and provisioning of services in accordance with
wit11
their intended purpose. Their impact is more pronounced than network congestion due to the concentrated and targeted nature of resource depletion and clogging, which not only impacts
iinpact,~quality of service
(QoS)
(QoS) but can affect the very availability of services.
services. When the attack is distributed---e.g.,
distributed---e.g.. affected by
multiple compromised
cornpromised hosts on the Internet-then
Internet-then its impact is proportionally severe.
severe.
Susceptibility to DoS is an intrinsic problem of any service provisioning system where,
where. at a minimum,
niinimnin.
the
packet) must be processetl
processed
(e.g., service request,
request,. TCP
T C P SYN packet,)
t,he occurrence of a potentially valid event (e.g.,
to
validity. Even though the resource expenditure associated with processing a single
t,o ascertain its validity.

negligible. when this is multiplied by the large factors enabled by the high bandwidth of
event may be negligible,
networks, its impact can be significant no matter how small the individual processing
modern broadband networks,
effective means
nleans
overhead. As with prank telephone calls or ringing of door bells in days gone by.
by, an effective
give11
of preventing DoS attacks from occurring in the first place-also
place-also the only fundamental solution given
of' the attacker
the intrinsic susceptibility of service provisioning systems to DoS-lies
DoS~lies in identification of
(e.g.. legal or economical)
economical) to the perpetrating entity.
entity. Even
which admits assigning commensurate costs (e.g.,
attacker, if the physical source of
if the attack was instituted from compromised hosts intruded by an attacker,
DoS traffic can be identified,
identified. then at the very least the invaded network element can be isolated or shut

instances, the attacker's identity can be further traced back by state information
down, and in some instances,
down,
remnant on the compromised system.
system.
In this paper we address two complementary problems and goals:
goals: (1)
(1) source identification (i.e.,
(i.e.. IP
IP
traceback) of
(2) prevention of spoofed IP
I P packets from
fi-om reaching their destination.
destination.
of' spoofed IP
I P flows,
flows, and (2)

(DDoS) attack prevention called
We describe a novel approach to proactive/reactive
proactive/reactive distributed DoS (DDoS)
autonomous system (AS)
(AS)
route-based distributed packet filtering and evaluate its efficacy in Internet autonomous
topologies.
topologies.

1.2

New Contributions

(DPF) uses routing information to determine if a packet arrivRoute-based distributed packet filtering (DPF)
ing at a router-e.g.,
router~e.g., border router at an AS-is
AS-is valid with respect to its inscribed source/destination
source/destination
addresses,
addresses, given the reachability constraints imposed by routing and network topology. A single AS~
ASthere were 4872
4572 autonomous systems on the
thc Internet
Intcrnct in 1999~can
1999-can only exert a limited impact
iinpact with

identifyiilg and discarding forged IP
I P flows.
flows. At the other extreme, if all autonomous
aut,oilomous systems
systeills
respect to identifying
and their routers implement router-based packet filtering,
filtering, then no spoofed IP
I P flows
flows can escape,
escape. but its

ultimate effect is not much different from that achievable by perfect ingress filtering.
filtering.
1

Route-based DPF's main strength lies in the
partial coverage or deployment,---about
deployment---about
t,he fact that with partia.1
18%
proactively prevents
18% in Internet AS
AS topologies-a
t,opologies-a synergistic
synergistic filtering effect can be achieved that proa.ctively
spoofed IP
place_ Proactive protection,
I P flows
flows from
froin reaching other autonomous
autonomous systems in the first place.
due
properties of Internet topology,
topology, cannot be perfect. It is.
is, however, strong
due to
to intrinsic
intrinsic connectivity
c~nnectivit~y
enough
sufficiently sparse and,
enough such that those IP
I P flows
flows that cannot be prevented from penetrating are sufficiently
as
sites. Thus, as with probabilistic
probabilistic
as aa consequence,
consequence, their origin can be localized to within 5 possible sites.
packet marking,
marking, effective
effective IP
I P traceback can serve as a deterrent as well as facilitate responsive, albeit
reactive recovery upon attack.
of route-based D
DPF
over PPM
attack. Another important proactive advantage of
P F over.
is
with
is its
its robustness
rob~st~ness
wit,h respect to distributed DoS. Unlike PPM whose attack site localization deteriorates
almost-proportionally
almost2-proportionallywith the number of attack hosts [20]--thus
[20]---thus necessitating commensurate time and
effort by the victim to recover-in
route-based
DPF
the
fraction of
of AS from which spoofed IIP
recover-in
DPF
fract,ioil
P flows can
reach other AS
which
makes
harnessing attack sites (e.g.,
(e.g., by
AS is
is a small subpopulation (less
(less than 12%)
12%) ~
v l ~ i cinakes
h
intrusion)
implementation perspective.
perspective, D
DPF
intrusion) in a DDoS
DDoS attack more difficult for the attackerattacker. From an implementation
PF
does
does. I-Iowever,
However,
does not require expending IP
I P header fields
fields to encode stamped link information as PPM does.
computing appropriate
(e.g., BGP)
I3GP) is
appropriate filtering
filtering tables alongside existing inter-domain routing protocols (e.g.,
aa nontrivial problem due
ofInternet
due to the destination-based structure of
Internet routing protocols (inter-domain
and intra-domain).
intra-domain).
We
attacks, and this
We submit that few
few fundamental solutions exist for
fbr preventing distributed DoS attacks.
paper's main contribution
contribut,ion lies in advancing a scalable architecture for DDoS attack prevention that
is
principle, implementable in IP internetworks if
if global
is effective for
for Internet AS topology and is,
is, in principle.
routing
'Ve define relevant performance
performance measures
routing information is made available
available at border routers.
routers. We

filtering performance-both
performance-both proact,ive
that capture pertinent filtering
proactive and reactive-and
reactive-and show their intimate
structure ofInternet
of Internet AS topology. We
dependence on power-law structure
\Ve demonstrate the efficacy of
of route-based
route-based
DPF
D P F using comprehensive
comprehe~lsivebenchmarking with both Internet
Iilter~letAS and artificially generated network

topologies. Finding efficient implementations and evaluating t,he
topologies.
the costs associated with deployment and
router overhead vis-a.-vis
itself and a
vis-a-vis the demonstrated performance benefits is a major challenge in itself

for future
future work.
work.
task for
The rest of the
t,he paper is organized as follows.
follo~vs.In the next section.
The
section, we give a summary of
of related
related
works. In Section 3,
3. we define the key notions,
notions. measurement,
measurement. and performance variables for route-based
works.
route-based
DPF. We
We also
also discuss the core issues surrounding performance evaluation. In Section 4.
DPF.
4, we present
results based on benchmark experiments with both real and artificial network topologies.
performance results
We conclude with a discussion of our results.
We

2

Related Work

Several types
types of DoS
DoS attacks
atstackshave been identified [8,
[S. 17,
17. 301
Several
30] with the most basic DoS attack demanding
resources than
thail the
trhe target system or network can supply.
supply. R.esources
more resources
Resources may be network bandwidth,
file system
system space,
space. processes, or network connections
connectlions [17].
[17]. While host,-based
file
host-based DoS attacks are more easily
2

managed. network-based DoS attacks which exploit weaknesses of the TCP
T C P lIP
/ I P protocol
traced and managed,

[Is]. represent a more
inore subtle and challenging threat [17,
[17: 23].
231. Network-based
att-acks. by
suite [151,
Network-based DoS attacks,
forge the source address of DoS packets, and thereby hide the identity of
default. employ spoofing to forge
default,
the pllysical
physical source [4].
[4]. Previous works have focused 011
oil detecting DoS attacks and mitigating their

detriniental impact upon the victim [I,
[l: 13,24,27].
13; 24, 271. This approach does not eliminate the
t,he problem, nor
detrimental
does it deter pot,eilt,ial
potential attackers.
attackers.

identification-also called IP
I P traceback [23]-which
[23]-which
A number of recent works have studied source identification-also
t,echniques with their individual pros and cons.
cons. In link testing,
testing. the physical source of
span a range of techniques
an attack is identified by tracing it back hop-by-hop through the network [29].
[29]. Traceback is typically

performed manually and recursively repeated at the upstream router until the originating host is
reached. The drawbacks of link testing include multiple branch points,
reached.
points, slow traceback during an
attack,
attack. communication
cominunicat,ion overhead due to message exchange. and administrative constraints
const,raint,s between
network operators [29].
[29]. The audit trail approach facilitates tracing via traffic logs at
a.t routers and

[22. 281. This method is conducive to off-line traceback of DoS attacks.
attacks. A principal weakness,
gateways [22,28].
however. is the high storage and processing overhead incurred at routers which can
call exert a significant

burden. In behavioral monitoring [17]'
[17], the likely behavior of an attacker during a DoS attack is
monitored to identify the source.
source. For example, an attacker may perform DNS requests to resolve the

cache. During a DoS
name of the target host which may not be resident in its local name server's cache.
attack,
attack, an attacker may
inay try to gauge the impact of the attack using various service requests
request.s including
Web and ICMP echo requests. Thus,
Thus, logging of such events and activities can reveal information
inforination about
the attacker's source.
source.
In packet-based traceback, packets are marked with the addresses of intermediate
intermediat,e routers,
routers, in some

sense,
I P Record Route option [21].
[21]. The
sense, an inverse operation of source routing and similar to the IP
victim uses information
illformation inscribed in packets to trace the attack back to its source. A related method is
generating information packets-separate
packets-separate from
packets-that convey analogous path information
from data packet-t,hat

inessages to the victim [2].
[2]. In both methods,
methods, overhead in the form of variableas ICMP traceback messages
length marking
markiiig fields that depend on path length or traffic overhead due to extra messaging packets
are incurred. Probabilistic packet marking [3,
231 has been proposed for achieving the best of both
[3, 23]

field and processing efficiency
efficiency in the form of
worlds-space efficiency in the form of constant marking field
worlds-space
support-at the expense of introducing uncertainty due to probabilistic sampling of
minimal router support-at
flow's path.
path. The effectiveness
effectiveness of probabilistic packet marking was analyzed when considering the
a flow's
intrinsic vulnerability of marking field spoofing [20]
[20] and shown that the attacker's location can be
localized to within 5 equally likely sites on the Internet under single-source attack.
attack. Improved marking
schemes including for authentication were studied in [26].
properties, PPM
[26]. In
I11 spite of its efficiency
efficie~lcypr~pert~ies,
PPM
has several drawbacks: (i)
(i) spoofed packets are allowed to exert their debilitating influence on server

I P header must be expended to inscribe link
(ii) bits in the IP
resources before being reactively curtailed: (ii)
information; and (iii)
(iii) uncertainty of IP
I P traceback amplifies proportionally with
wit11 the number
nunlber of hosts
information;
partaking in the distributed DoS attack.
attack. We show that route-based distributed packet filtering,
filtering, in

3

addition to matching the IP
I P traceback prowess of PPM,
PPM. solves its three weaknesses.
Packet filtering is a network security mechanism for controlling what data can flow to and from
a network
net,work affected routers or firewalls [33].
[33]. Filtering decisions,
decisions. typically,
t,ypically. are made based on packet
content including source/destination
source/destination addresses and port numbers. As a means of preventing networkbased DoS attacks,
attacks. ingress filtering in border gateways has been proposed for limiting IP
I P source address
spoofing
spoofiilg [5,
[5, 7,
7. 25,
25, 31].
3 11. Ingress filtering requires a prolonged period to be broadly deployed on the
Internet, and even then, it is subject to attacks from AS that are not compliant (see
(see Section 4.5
4.5 for a
discussion of its performance effects).
effects).

3
3.1
3.1

Route-based Distributed Packet Filtering
Route-based Detection of Spoofed IP Packets

Consider the AS topology shown in Figure 3.1
3.1 which depicts the routes from node 2 to all other nodes
(solid
(solid arrows).
arrows). Assume a host belonging to AS 7 is attempting a DoS attack targeted at a server
residing in AS 4 by using a forged source IP
I P address belonging to AS 2. A border router belonging
to AS 6 at t,he
the peering point with AS 7-if
topology-would recognize that a
7-if cognizant of the route t,opology-would
packet originating from AS 2 destined to
t,o AS 4 would not enter through link (7,6)
(7.6) implying that its
source address must be spoofed. Such packets could be discarded at AS 6 thus proactively protecting
AS 4 from the DoS attack.
attack. Note that in this specific
specific instance AS 6 only need inspect the source IP
IP
address to determine that no packet from
froin AS 2-irrespective
2-irrespective of destination IP
I P address-can
address-can arrive on
link (7,6).
(7.6). This example serves to illustrate the potential opportunities available by exploiting routing
information to identify and filter spoofed packets at forwarding points in the
t,he system. We remark that
8

9

-

ROUies
Rouie, from
fiom node
node 2
* Ar~ack
flom node 7 wilh
w i ~ hnode 2 address
addles5
-.-. .
-~
AH<\ck from

Figure 3.1:
3.1: Illustration of route-based packet filtering executed at
a t node 6.
6. Note 7 uses IP
I P address
belonging to node 2 when attacking node 4.
the above description--from
perspective-is
description--from an inter-domain IP
I P routing perspective
-is imprecise. First,
First, an edge in the
AS graph between a pair of nodes is in general a set of peering point connections and all corresponding
border routers must carry out the specified filtering tasks. Second,
Second, two or more IP
I P prefixes belonging
to the same destination AS may lead to different
paths on an AS topology. This is incorporated in our
different, pat,hs
AS inodel
model by allowing multi-path routring.
routing. Third, we ignore potentially relevant classification of AS
nodes into stub,
transit AS where only the latter may engage in routing proper (i.e.,
stub, multi-homed,
multi-homed: and trailsit
(i.e.,
in the sense of packet forwarding).
\Vhell we speak of an AS node performing route-based filtering,
forwarding). Wheii
filtering,
4

complex. although logical consistency
it must be understood that the finer resolution picture is more complex,
between the two descriptions is achieved.
I P address belonging to AS 8
Consider the case where the attack host residing in AS 7 uses an IP
when attacking servers in AS 4.
4. The gateway at AS 6 cannot unambiguously decide that the IP
I P packet
with source address in AS 8 is spoofed since it may indeed have come from AS 8 (and forwarded by

7). This demonstrates that performing route-based filtering at a single site can achieve only so
AS 7).
much. Route-based distributed packet filtering aims to achieve a synergistic,
synergistic, proactive filtering effect
through the collective action of a small number of AS nodes. The key objectives of DPF
D P F can be
summarized as follows:
packets; (ii)
follows: (i)
(i) maximize proactive filtering of spoofed IP
I P packets:
(ii) for bogus packets

miniinize the number of sites that could have sent the packets (IP
( I P traceback):
traceback):
that do get through, minimize
achieve objectives (i)
(i) and (ii)
(ii) while minimizing the number of sites at which route-based filtering is
carried out;
out; (iv)
(iv) in tandem with (iii),
(iii). find the optimum sites where filtering is to be performed.

3.2
3.2

Maximal and Semi-maximal Filters

= (V,
(V, E)
E) be an undirected graph representing Internet AS topology.
t,opology. We remark that our
Let G =

framework and conclusions may be carried over to router topologies within an AS, however, presently
1
large, commercial autonomous systems
systems1,
little is known about the internal structure of large,
, and testing

studies. Let £(
L(u,
v) denote the set of all loop-free paths from uu to
needs to await further measurement studies.
u, v)
u, v E V.
V. A routing algorithm and its computed routes lead to a subset R
( u , v)
v where u,v
R(u,v)

c:;:;

L ( u , v). An
£(u,v).

( s , t)
t ) with
wit11 source IP
I P address s and destination IP
I P address t is routed through the network
net,work
I P packet M
IP
M(s,
t). If
If IIR(s,
R ( s , t)1
t ) 1 > 1,
1. we assume a separate network
net,work mechanism resolves selection among
according to R(s;
R(s, t).
5.7.
multiple paths. Performance results for multi-path routing are discussed in Section 5.7.

v2

+ {O,
(0.1)
(u. v) E
E E
A filter Fe
Fe : V 2 ~
I} is a function defined for link e == (u,
E where this is interpreted
to mean that a gateway router in v acting as a peering point inspects an IP
I P packet M ((s,
s . t)
t ) arriving

e, then decides whether to forward the packet (Fe(s,
(I;k(s, t)
t) =
= 0),
0), or filter-i.e.,
filter-i.e., discard-the
discard-the packet
on e,

(Fe(s,
Fe a mute-based
( F e ( s .t)t ) =
= 1).
1). We call 17,
1-ou.te-basedpacket filter with respect to R if
Fe(s,t ) =

C

R(s, t);
0: if e E R(s.
t);
1, otherwise.

"e E R
( s , t)"
t ) " to mean that link e is on
To avoid cluttering, with a slight abuse of notation, we use "e
R(s,
t,o R(s.
t ) . Similarly for a node v.
v. A route-based filter is maximal if it satisfies
some path belonging to
R(s, t).

Fe (s, t)
R(( s,
Fe(s,
t) =
=0
O if,
if; and only if,
if: there exists a path in R
s , t)
t ) with e as one of its links. Thus a maximal routebased filter carries out all the filtering of spoofed IP
I P traffic that is possible without adversely affecting
routing of non-spoofed IP
R. If
I P packets as determined by R.
If a set of route-based filters
filters collectively were
"perfect" in the sense that no spoofed datagram
datagrain is allowed to reach its destination,
destination, then this may be
lRouter
power-law connectivity structure similar
'Router topologies mav
ma\ obey
o l ~ e ypowel.-law
sirllilar to AS
.4S topologies [6,
[6. 18].
181. There are,
are. however,
ho\vever.

sernar~ticdifferences bet\vcer~
.AS and router topoJogies~e.g.,
to11ologies-e.g.. geographical
geograpl~icaldistance between two
tmo nodes
riodes in
i r ~an
arl AS
.4S graph
semantic
bet\\'l'en AS
rrlay not
riot bbee meaningful-which
rneariingful-n.11ic.h have
ha\-e to be taken
taker1 into
i r ~ t oconsideration
cor~sideratior~
\vlieri advancing
advancirig interpretations.
iriterpl.etations
rnay
when

5

viewed as providing a form of authentication service.
service. Computing a maximal route-based filter~e.g.,
filter-e.g..
2
table-is straightforward,
straightforward. but it requires in general O(n
O(n2)
( n == IVI) which is an
) space (n
represented as a table~is

overwhelming burden to place on routers that are expected to perform fast table look-up.
A semi-m.aximal
seml:-maxl:mal filter is a maximal filter which uses only
oilly the source IP
I P address of a packet to
t,o carry

(i.e.. a projection of F,).
words. fie(s,
t ) is a semi-maximal
with. respect
out its filtering (i.e.,
Fe)' In other words,
Fe(s, t)
seml:-maximal filter
filter with

to R if

{O,.0.1 .
F7e (s, tt )) =
fie(s,
=
.
1,

:

if e E R
( s , v ) for
for some
some v E V;
V;
ife
R(s,v)
h erWlse.
.
ot
otherwise.

Hence.,. its filtering capability is,
is, in general,
general. less than that of its maximal counterpart,
counterpart,. i.e.,
i.e.. pFe(s,
e ( s .t)t )
Hence.

5
<

Fe(s, t).
power~by not much as shown in Section
5~a semiF,(s,
t). Although we lose in potential filtering power-by
Sectioil 5-a
maximal filter can be represented by a filtering table in linear space which brings it in the
t,he domain of

feasibility if not practicality.
feasibility
practicality. As with routing and techniques for speed-up of routing
routiilg table look-up,
optiinizat,ions will be needed to affect practical implementations.
further optimizations

3.3
3.3

A Remark on Implementability

in the context of IP
I P internetworks is not space
The most important implementation concern m
requirement-many issues
requirement~many

are shared with routing table look-up-but
look-up~butthe computation of semi-maximal

T <;::
C VV given a routing algorithm RR.. The main
filters at routers belonging to participating AS nodes T
filters
I P routing-interdifficulty arises from the fact that IP
routing~inter- and intra-domain-follows
intra-domain~followsa destination-based
approach where routing table update exchanges convey information
information about destination reachability but

not "source reachability." In BGP, for example,
example. an update message contains AS-PATH which is a setffe
quence of AS numbers that identify the autonomous systems-starting
systems~startingwith the AS that originated the
I P prefix-from
advertisement of reachability for an IP
prefix~from which, if assuming bi-directionality
bi-directionality and bounceback of an "ACK-to-Update" message,
message, source information may be extracted. At a minimum this would
BGP. In addition,
addition,
require augmentation to BGP, or introduction of a new protocol that interacts with BGP.
some form of compression and encoding may be needed to keep the return messages small-including
small~including

a t branch points-given
merger of several ACK-to-Update
ACK-to- Update messages at
points~given their tendency to grow in number
tile closer they reach the target AS (the
(the essential overhead associated with breaking routing
and size the

cllallenges arise when trying to construct an accurate global AS routing map.
map.
asymmetry). Other challenges
asymmetry).
We do not have an answer to the efficient implementability question for IP
I P internets.
internets. This may,
may.

DPFis Achilles' heel. We view the contribution of this paper to lie in the
perhaps, be route-based DPF's
definition and evaluation of a scalable DDoS prevention architecture as part of a set of fundamental
fundament-a1

t,he denial-of-service attack problem (of which there are few),
few), and Internet specificity is
solutions to the
injected with respect to showing how filtering performance depends on topological properties of Internet

D P F are encouraging and suggest that
AS. We believe that the performance results for route-based DPF
D P F so as to minimize overhead and cost for Internet
investigation of how to implement route-based DPF
deployment may be worthwhile and should be the focus
focus offuture
of future effort. However,
However, a cost-benefit analysis
of the gains
ga.iiis vis-a.-vis
vis-a-vis the associated costs is a matter of debate and further examination.
examination.
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3.4
3.4.1
3.4.1

Performance Measures for Distributed Packet Filtering
F i l t e r i n g Effect: Attacker
A t t a c k e r and
a n d Victim
V i c t i m Perspectives
Perspectives
Filtering

(semi) maximal
nlaxiinal filter is distributed if it is executed at more than one node in F.
1". We will use TT to
t,o
A (semi)

T
denote a subset T

C FV

<,;;;

filtering is performed. We calli
call y == ITI/IVI the coverage
coveru.ge ru.t,io.
of nodes where filtering
f·otio.

filtering effect of route-based DPF-including
DPF-including IP
I P traceback-we
t,raceback-we
To quantify and measure the collective filtering
First. we define two families
define a set of performance metrics that is used in the rest of the paper.
paper. First,
of variables Sa,t and Cs,t
Cs:l (a,
(a. ss,; t E F)
V) which are then used to define other high-level measures of more

quant,ifying DDoS mitigation.
direct interest and relevance to quantifying

S,,t denotes the set of nodes-more
nodes-more precisely, the set of IP
I P addresses belonging to an AS node in
Sa,t
Sa,t-t,l~at an attacker at AS a can use as spoofed source IP
I P addresses to
t,o reach t1 without being cut-off
Sa,t-that

T. I3y
By definition,
definition, a E Sa.t for all a,
a. t E F.
1'. The larger the
by filters
filters executed at autonomous systems in T.
set Sa,t, the more options an attacker at
a t a has in terms of forging
forging the IP
I P source address field
field with
wit11 a

bogus address which will go undetected and unhindered with respect to R at filters in T.
T . Whereas Sa,t
SaZt
CS.i captures the victim's perspe~t~ive
set,
is defined from the attacker's perspective, Cs,t
perspective and denotes the set

M(s,
of nodes that could have sent an IP
I P packet M
( s , t)
t ) with spoofed source IP
I P address s and destination
address t which did not get filtered on its way.
Cs?t for
for all ss,. t E F
I" in the definition. The
way. We allow s E Cs,t
larger Cst,
M(s,
CKt, the more uncertain the victim at t is upon receiving spoofed packet M
( s . t)
t ) with respect

ICs:tl =
= 1,
1: then this means that IP
I P address s cannot be used by any
ally attacker
origin. If
If ICs,tl
to its true origin.

V (outside
(outside of s itself) to mount a spoofed DoS attack aimed at t.
t. Figure 3.2
3.2 illustrates the impact
aa. E F
of route-based distributed filtering on curtailing the attacker's ability to engage in spoofing. Without

Attacker

%
!
j

3.2: Left:
Left: With route-based filtering executed at
a t node 8,
8, the spoofable address range at attack
atta,ck
Figure 3.2:
S1.9 =
= {a,
(0: I,
1 , 2,
2 .3,
3 ,4,5,6,7,
4 ;5,6,7.,8}
8) to {a,
(0; 1,2,3,4,
1,2: 3.4,5).
Right,: Distributed filtering with
site 1 is reduced from 51,9
5}. Right:

a t AS 3,
3. the spoofable range further reduces to 51,9
S1;g =
= {I,
(1; 2}.
2).
filter F
F at
filtering, an attacker residing at
a t AS 1 can disguise himself with undetectable spoofed IP
IP
route-based filtering,
i.e.. 51,9
S1,g =
= {a,
(0; 1,
1 ,...
. . . ,8},
, 8 ) . when attacking a server in AS 9.
9. With routeaddresses belonging to AS 0-8, i.e.,
spoof'able address range shrinks to {a,
( 0 ,1,
l . ...
. . . ,5}.
. 5 ) . With distributed filtering
filtering
a t AS 8,
8, the spoofable
based filtering at
S1.g
= {I,
(1.2).
3, 5
at AS 8 and AS 3,
2}.
1 ,9 =

3.4.2

P r o a c t i v e Filtering
F i l t e r i n g Measures
Measures
Proactive

Q1(r)
immediate-but also practically useless-proactive
useless-proactive filtering effect is captured by <I>
The most immediate-but
1 (T) which

>

<

@1(r)
= I{t:
({t : 'if
\J a E F,
V. IS,:tl
5 T}I
r)1 nn-l.1 . The range of Tis
r is T
r 2 1.
1. Thus,
Thus, a
0 ::;
5 <I>d1)
Q1(l) ::; 1
is defined as <I>dT)
=
ISa,tl ::;

7

denotes the fraction of AS's
AS'S that cannot be reached by spoofed packets
packet,^ from anywhere.
anywhere. The closer

cP1 ( I ) is to 1,
1, the fewer the number of AS's
AS'S exposed to DoS attack.
attack. For 72':
r 2 2,
2. c"Pd7)
Q1(7) has a less relevant
<PI(l)
it,s appealing semantic relevance,
relevance. we will show that
and directly interpretable meaning. In spite of its

cP1 (1)
(1) is near zero for Internet AS topologies when the coverage ratio 'I
y is not near L
1. and thus
t.hlis of little
<PI
import as a performance measure.

subtle. but practically relevant,
relevant, proactive performance measure is given by
A more subtle,

n

cP2(l)measures the fraction of attack sites from which sending spoofed IP
I P packets targeted at other
<P2(l)

T. Thus,
Thus. if c"P
cD2(1)
= 0.8,
0.8: then an attacker wishing to
AS is futile since they will be filtered by nodes in T.
2(1) =
80% of all autonomous
alitonomol~s
engage in DDoS attack cannot make productive use of attack hosts residing in 80%
systems.
systems. This imposes an upper bound on the distributedness
distributediless of DDoS attack achievable by any
attacker, severely limiting the latter the closer <P2
(1) is to 1.
cP2(1)
I. Policy-wise,
Policy-wise. it is also possible for other
ot,her AS
to be "on guard" with respect to traffic emanating from AS where mounting an
a.n attack is feasible. As

cP1(r),
cP2(r)
cP1d(1).
however. <P2
cP2(l)
with <P
I (7), <P2
(7) does not have directly relevant semantics for 7r 2'2: 2. Unlike <P
1), however,
(1)
topologies. It is our priilcipal
measure.
principal proactive performance measure.
achieves large values for Internet AS topologies.
cP3(r),8,
0 :and \[12(7)
Q 2 ( r ) are auxiliary metrics capturing proactive filtering
filt,ering with
wit,h less sharply delineated
<P3(7),
cP3(r)== I{(a,t)
I{(a,;t ) : ISa,tl
IS,;tl ~
L 7}I/n(n
r)l/n,(n -- 1),
1); \[12(7)
Q 2 ( r ) == I{s:
I{s : VV t E V,
V , ICs,tl
ICs.tl ~
5
semantics which are defined as <P3(7)
r )}I/
I / nn,, and 8
O=
= I{
I{(a.s:t)
E Sa,t}l/n(n -- 1)2
1)2 =
= I{(o.,
I { ( a s,
s . tt)) : a E
E Cs,tll/n(n
Cs,i)l/n(n -- 1)2.
I ) ~ <1>3(1)
cP3(1)
.
(a, s, t) : ss E
denotes the

7

2 - n)
(out of a total of n
n2
t,he
- n) where the attacker cannot reach the
fraction of all attacker-victim AS pairs (out

I P packets. Thus an attacker whose aim is to wreck general havoc on the Internet
victim with spoofed IP
via DoS attack without specific interest in a particular victim
victi'm may choose random attack site-victim
(1), the less impact such random DDoS attacks will have. 8
pairs to do so.
so. The larger <P3
cP3(l)?
O captures the

volume-ratio of unfilterable packets-when:
addition. attacks are mounted using
reduced attack volume-ratio
packets-when, in addition,
randomly inscribed source IP addresses.
(7), viewed from the attacker's
perspective, represents the
addresses. \[12
Q2(7).
at,tacker's perspective.
fraction of all (spoofable)
(spoofable) IP addresses whose use would allow the victim to localize the attack
attrack site to
within 7r locations.

3.4.3
3.4.3

Measure: IP Traceback
Reactive Filtering Measure:

The performance measures defined in the previous section are proactive in nature in that they capture

I P packets are prevented from reaching their destination in the first place by
how effectively spoofed IP
filters in T.
T. Perfect proactivity, as captured by <PI
cP1 (1)
(1) »
>> 0,
0, however,
however, is intrinsically difficult to
t,o achieve

y ;::;;
zL
1. Significant,
Significant,
in Internet topologies due to their connectivity structure unless the coverage ratio 'I
albeit imperfect, proactive filtering
filtering is captured by the quantitative
quaiititative values of <P2(1),
cP2(1), <1>3(1),
cP3(1), 8,
0, and
'li
(1) plays the most relevant role.
cP2(l)
role.
Q 2(7),
2 ( r ) ,where <P2

I P packets can be effectively filtered,
filtered. complementing the proactive performance
Since not all spoofed IP

8

Ql (T)
(7) which captures
capt,ures the IP
I P traceback (or
(or source identification) effect:
effect:
measures is the reactive metric \[11

I{t: V 8 E V,

10s,tl ::; T}I

n

Ql (5)
(5) represents the fraction of (target)
(target,) autonomous systems which,
which. when attacked with
For example, \[11
witllin 5 possible attack sites.
sites. The
I P packet, can resolve the attack location to within
an arbitrary spoofed IP
parameter

> 11-meaningful
1 ----representsthe uncertainty
u~lcert~ainty
IP
~meaningful for values greater than l---represents
associated with IP

7 :::::
T

2 If Q1 (7) =
r a small
sillall constant,
constant. then
t,hen those spoofed IP
I P flows
flows that cannot
localization2.
traceback localization
. If \[11 (T) = 1 for T

spa.ilned by nodes in T
T can be effectively localized with
be prevented from penetrat,ing
penetrating the "filter net" spanned
sites. i.e.,
i.e.. we achieve IP
I P traceback.
traceback. This can
t o their true attack origin to within Tr candidate sites,
respect to
lindertaken against the
act as a deterrent as well as allow responsive on-line counter measures to be undertaken
Q3(7)
flows at appropriate peering points. \[13
attacking party including isolation of offending flows
(T) is analogously
Q3(7) with Os,t
Cs.t in place of S(d
S,:, but does not have relevant semantics and is omitted from
defined as <1>3(T)
further consideration.

Performance Evaluation and Benchmarking Issues

4
4.1

Overall Objectives

(semi) maximal distributed filter :F
F is given by a triple :F
F == (G,
( G ,T,
T , R)
R) where
Formally a route-based (semi)
= (V,
(V. E)
graph, T
TC
V the subset of AS where route-based filtering is performed, and R
G=
E) is the AS graph,
~ V
I
I
algorithm. For two route-based DPF's :F
F=
= (G,
(G, T,
T, R)
R) and :F
F=
= (G,
(G.T
TI.
R ) with T
TC
TI,
is the routing algorithm.
~ T
, R)
,
IS,,tl ::;
< IS~,tl an9
and 10s,tl
JC,.ll ::;
< 10~,tl
ICL,,I for all a,
a. 8,
s. t E V.
V. This,
This. in turn,
turn, implies
it can be checked that ISa,tl
<1>2
(1) ::;
<1>~ (1) and \[I
Q2(1)
5 Qh(1)
Qd
1 (T)r ) ::;
< Q\[I~i (T)
( r ) for all T
7 :::::
2 1.
1. Similar monotonicity
monotoilicity properties hold for the other
I
performance metrics. Moreover,
Moreover. <1>~(l)
@h(l)=
= \[I~
Qi(1)
= 1 if T
T' =
=V
V (i.e.,
(i.e., there is a trivial lower bound).
(1) =
bound).
F with respect to the proactive and reactive performance measures
Evaluating the effectiveness of :F
G. the size of the filter net T,
T . its structure,
structure, and routing
entails studying its dependence on topology G,
relatioilships and find feasible means to economize T
T when trying
R
R.. Our goal is to uncover the above relationships
to achieve a target performance.

4.2

Influence of Topology

[6, 10]
101 which may
Empirical evidence shows that Internet AS topology exhibits power-law connectivity [6,
[18]. Power-law graph structure induces "centers"
"centersx where connectivity
also hold for router topologies [18].
(e.g., comprised of
of
nodes, with most vertices possessing sparse connectivity (e.g.,
is concentrated on a few nodes,
AS). A key aspect of our DDoS benchmark evaluation is to
AS stubs and non-transit multi-homed AS).
rcactivc pcrformance
cmploy 19971997if, and how,
how, topology affects proactive and reactive
ascertain if,
performance of DPF. We employ
1999 Internet AS topologies taken from NLANR.
[16] which have been used in other studies aimed at
1999
NLANR. [16]
'See [20]
[20] for a discussio~l
localizat.io11 i~~ue~-al~o
issues-also called uncertainty factor-under
factor-u~lder probabili~tic
probabilistic packet
2See
di~cu~~ion of IP traceback localization
~~larking.
marking.
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understanding the connectivity structure of Internet topology. especially with respect to its recently
discovered power-law property [6].
[6]. In addition to
t,o actual Internet
Int,ernet AS topologies,
topologies, we use artificial

gei~erat~ors
[12. 14]
1.41 and random graphs to perform comparative benchmarking. An
Internet topology generators
[12.
(unintended) side effect of our study is the reverse evaluation of artificial topology generators with
(unintended)
relevalit graph properties-above-and-beyond
relations-in the context
respect to capturing relevant
properties-above-and-beyond power-law relations-in
of DPF.

4.3
4.3

Filter Placement

s,ize of the filter net T
T on DPF
D P F performance, for a given coverage
In addition to the influence of the S'lze

y == ITI/n,
ITI/n; the selection of the nodes in T
T is a key performance variable. We consider the effect
ratio r
T randomly-we
randomly-we sample from 1/
1" uniformly randomly until a target coverage size ITI
IT1 is
of choosing T
3.
reached-and
particular,
reached-and by more customized
custon~izeddesign rules,
rules. in ~
a r t ~ i c u l athe
r , case when T
T forms
forms a vertex cover
cover3.

It can be checked that T
T being a vertex cover (VC)
(VC) is neither
neit,her a sufficient nor necessary condition for
(f>~
@ $(1)
( I )== \jJ~
! P ~(T)
( T )==

1.
1. However.
IIowever. since a VC forms a cover of all edges in the graph-~being
graph--being VC implies

that on any path, at least every other vertex on the path belongs to T
-it may be expected that the
T-it
t,he

t,andem, the presence of "centers"
"centers"
VC property is conducive to enhancing the performance of DPF. In tandem,

y may be achievable.
achievable.
in power-law graphs leads one to expect that a small coverage ratio r
[9]. We use two approximation
Finding a minimal VC in a graph is an NP-complete problem [9].
algorithms-one
algorithms-one with a constant factor guarantee and the other a heuristic-for
heuristic-for finding
finding small VCs.
The first algorithm is a well-known constant-factor approximation scheme whose output is guaranteed to be at most twice as large as an optimal VC [19].
[19]. There is a randomization component, and

~nultiple(in our evaluations 10)
111) times with the smallest VC conScheme is run multiple
the approximation '!Jcheme
output. The second algorithm is a heuristic: little is known rigorously about its
stituting the final output.
behavior although,
although, in practice;
outperforins the constant-factor approximation scheme.
scheme.
practice, it oftentimes outperforms
heuristic--greedy algorithm-iteratively
algorithin-iteratively grows a VC by picking a node which covers the most
The heuristic--greedy
remaining uncovered edges. The presence of centers in power-law graphs makes it more conducive for
the heuristic to find small VCs which is verified in our performance results. We use the minimum VC

T.
found by the two algorithms as our T.
centers''
We also consider a rank-based placement strategy to isolate VC's tendency to pick "large centers"
vis-A-vis its complete edge covering property. Vve
We call this algorithm Rank, and it simply orders vertices
vis-a.-vis
by their degree (in
(in decreasing order)
order) and selects the top r
y percentage as elements of T.
T. We show that
diininished performance effect than VC.
Rank-even
T---affects a diminished
Rank-even with larger T---affects

4.4

Maximal vs. Semi-maximal Filters

filters which are,
are, in general, less powerful than maxOur performance results are for semi-maximal filters
filters. In comparative
cornparative evaluations we show that replacing semi-maximal with maximal filters
filters
imal filters.
3T
E is incident
9is a veTtex
vertex coveT
cover of G
C: if
if every edge in
ill E
irlcidemt on
om some node ill T.
T
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ail incremental improvement in proactive/reactive
results only in an
proactive/reactive filtering performance. The marginal
performailce
difference-e.g., maximal filtering can localize to within 4 sites for IP
I P traceback instead
performance difference-e.g.,
of 5-justifies
t,he use of semi-maximal filters
filters when performing route-based DPF
D P F in addition to its
5-justifies the

con~iderat~ion
efficiency.
consideration
of efficiency.

4.5

Ingress Filtering

~ v h e nthe nodes in T
T were to perforin
only. Then for coverage
Consider the case when
perform ingress filtering only.

y=
= ITI/n,
ITl/n.. the
tile DDoS prevention performance effect as captured
capt,ured by (J)2(1)
@ 2 ( 1 ) and 'h(T)
Q l ( r ) would be:
ratio l'

>

Q2(1) == 1':
y. 'h(T)
Q 1 ( r ) == 0 for T
7 < n -- ITI
IT1 and \[Ir(T)
Q1(r) == 1 for T
7 2: n
n, -- IT!.
ITI. Thus,
Thus, ingress filtering,
filtering, unless
<J>2(1)
alillost everywhere, is an ineffective
ineffective DDoS prevention strategy. Even when.,
when y =
= 0.95,
0.95: for
carried out almost
= 4872,
4872. IP
I P traceback capability as captured by \[11
Q1 incurs a
1999 Internet AS topology where n =
the 1999

uncert,ainty factor of 243
243 (the
(the trivial
t,rivial number of possible attack sites to investigate when
non-constant uncertainty
location). There is little compelling reason for a group of AS in
trying to pin down the true attack location).
Int,ernet to
t,o form trusted
t,rusted security partnerships based on mandatory ingress filtering since the
the global Internet
effect, is low.
low. In contrast,
contrast, we show that when AS in T
T implement route-based
collective perforinailce
performance effect
DPF: then with l'
y < 0.2
0.2 coverage <J>2(1)
Q2(1) > 0.88
0.88 and \[Id5)
Q1(5) =
=1
1 for 1997-1999
1997-1999 Internet AS topologies.
topologies.
DPF,

4.6

Routing

The set of feasible routes is influenced by topology but, in addition, we consider the impact of having
multiple paths from
Note that R'
froin source to destination.
destination. Not,e
for all

T
7

c:;C R implies <J>2
(1) :::
<J>~ (1) and \[11
Q2(1)
< @;(I)
Q1(T)
(7) :::
< \[I~
Qi (T)
(7)

2:
paths-not necessarily
2 1.1. Consider routing
routring policies that allow R to have up to m separate paths-not

disjoint.-between
disjoint,-bet,ween two nodes. This allows us to evaluate
evaluat,e the influence, other things being equal, that the
more paths are permitted when routing a packet from source t.o
to destination,
destination, the more easily the packet

rout,e-based filtering when using spoofed source IP
I P addresses. The latter is due to the attack
can elude route-based
site's spoofable IP
a.ddress space Sa,t
S,:l having increased. When multi-path routing is performed between
I P address

IR(a. t)1
t)l =
= m,
m: we select m shortest paths from £(a,
L ( a , t).
t ) . In the case where two
a and t with IR(a,
two nodes a
or more candidat.es
pat.h length,
candida.tes have the
t,he same path
length, we choose the path coming first in the canonical (i.e.,
(i.e.,
lexicographic)
R:: loose and tight.
lexicographic) order.
order. VYe
We give special names to two ext.reme
extreme forms
forins of R
tight. "R=loose"
means that all possible paths among two nodes can be used for routing, i.e.,
i.e., R(a,
R ( a l t)
t) =
= £(a,
L(a, t).
t ) . When
= 1),
I ) , we choose a shortest path between a and t,
t , and denote
R allows only a single routing path (m
(m =

this case as "R=tight."

5
5.1

Performance Results
Set-up

We have built,
dpf which implements the benchmarking set.-up
set-up
Vie
built a performance evaluation tool called dpf
Sect,ioii 4. dpf
dpf consists of t.hree
three core modules: cover,
c o v e r , dpf,
dpf, and stats.
s t a t s . cover
c o v e r handles t.he
the
described in Section

11

generation
generatioil of T
T with various input specifications including random selection, VC, and rank ordering.
dpf is
T,
is the
t,he main module which computes
coinputes Sa.t
S,.t and 0C,.L:
8 , ( its input specification include the filter type, T,

and
performance measures
and routing algorithm.
algorithm. stats
s t a t s takes the output of dpf
dpf and computes the various performance
including
[14] to generate benchmark
@ ( I )and \I1(T).
Q ( r ) . We use topology generators Inet [12]
[12] and Brite 1141
including <1>(1)
graphs
graphs which
wliich are
are included in the test suite.
suite.

5.2
5.2
5.2.1
5.2.1

Proactive Filtering Effect
Limitations to
t o Perfect Proactivity

<1>J
attack-i.e., no spoofed IP packet
packet can
cP1 (1)
(1) measures the fraction
fraction of AS which are immune from DoS attack-i.e.,
reach
(middle) show Q1(r)
<1>dT) as a function
reacli them--distributed
t h e n distributed or single-source. Figures 5.1
5.1 (left)
(left) and (middle)
of
(WI =
= 3015 and
for different coverage
coverage and routing combinations for 1997 Internet AS topology (IVI
of' TT for

lEI
IEl =
=

5230).
= 4. That is, perfect proactivity where
5230). In Figure 5.1
5.1 (middle).
(middle). <1>dT)
(P1(r) =
= 0 up to T
r =

there
18.9%
t,here exists at least one AS that is immune from
froin DoS attack from anywhere is unachievable at 18.9%
coverage
overall, R =
= tight gives
circumstances. The two graphs show that, overall.
coverage ratio under the best of circumstances.
better performance than R
T being VCVC--the
of the 1997
R=
= loose
loose and,
and. other thing being equal, T
-the size of
Interuet
T being random even with higher coverages
I i ~ t e ~ i iAS
AS
e t vertex cover is 18.9%-is
18.9%-is more effective than T
Rnd30
R.nd30 (')'
(7=
= 0.3)
0.3) and Rnd50
Rnd5O h
(y =
= 0.5).
0.5). These plots depict a general trend but are not otherwise very

since for
for performance evaluation purposes only a<1>1l ((1)
l ) has direct relevance.
useful since
III

oos
Oft!
Ti~h1.RllJ50
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I
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M
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a l ((T)
r ) for R
5.1: 1997
1997 Internet AS topology. Left:
Left: <1>1
Figure 5.1:
R =
= loose.
loose. Middle: (PI
<1>1 (7)
(T) for R

=
=

SO

[00

tight.
tight. Right:

(TI while maintaining VC property.
(1) as
as a function of ITI
<1>j (1)
Figure 5.1
5.1 (right)
(right) shows that the limitation to achieving perfect proactivity does not change when
tshe VC
VC is
is grown to larger sizes
sizes up to 100%.
100%. Although eventually @
( I )becomes positive when covthe
<1>j ](1)
90%, its
its value is negligible to warrant the high cost of
is above
above 90%,
erage is
of almost full coverage. Perfect
iP1(l) is intrinsically
int,rinsically difficult to attain, and should not be construed as a
as captured by <1>1(1)
proactivity as
goal.
viable performance goal.
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5.2.2
5.2.2

DDoS and Proactive Filtering

a 2 (1)
( 1 ) measures
nlea.sures the fraction of AS from which DoS attacks cannot be launched since all spoofed
<P2
@2(1)thus puts an upper bound on the
packets-whoever
target-will be detected and filtered.
filtered. <P2(1)
packets-whoever their target-will
distxibutedness of DDoS attacks.
attacks. Figure 5.2 (left)
(left) and (middle)
(middle) show <P2(T)
Q2(7) as a function
function of T
r for
distributedness

R=
= loose and R =
= tight.
tight. As with <Pl.
Q1. <P2(T)
Q 2 ( r ) for T
r 2'2: 2 does not have a concrete,
concrete, relevant meaning and
Q2(1)
trend. Figure 5.2
5.2 (right)
(right) is the more relevant plot which shows <P2(1)
are shown to depict the general trend.
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5.2: 1997
1997 Internet AS topology.
topology. Left:
Left: <P2(T)
Q2(r) as a function of T
r for R
= loose.
loose. Middle:
Figure 5.2:
R =
Correspondiilg graph for R =
= tight.
tight. Right:
Right: <P2(1)
Qn(1) for 1997-1999 Internet AS topologies.
Corresponding
for Internet AS topologies during 1997-1999.
1997- 1999. <P2(1)
cP2(1) achieves a value of around 88%
88% during the three

12% of all autonomous systems can be used by attackers to launch DoS
years which implies that only 12%
attacks. Since the number of AS's
AS'S has grown from 3015 in 1997
1997 to
t o 3878
3575 in 1998
1998 to 4872 in 1999.
1999. the
attacks.
absolute number of possible attack sites has grown commensurately. However,
However. as a percentage, viable
attack sites have remained well-behaved at 12%.
12%.

Q3(r) as a function of T
r with <P3(1)
Q3(1) == 0.96.
0.96. That is,
is, only 4% of all source5.3 (left)
(left) shows <P3(T)
Figure 5.3
destination AS pairs are feasible attack AS/victim
perspective.
ASJvictim AS combinations from the attacker's perspective,

example, an attacker
where spoofed packets emitted from the attack AS can reach the victim AS. For example.
who tries to enlist attack hosts in a DDoS attack by intruding these hosts will waste 96% of its effort
if the source-destination AS's
AS'S are chosen randomly. Thus proactive filtering
filtering erects barriers in terms of
effort and cost to mounting effective DoS attacks which, in turn, can act as a deterrent in addition to
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5.3: 1997
1997 Internet AS topology. Left: <P3(T).
(P3(r). Middle: 8O as a function
fu~lctionof ITI.
ITI. Right:
R.ight: \[I2(T).
Q2(r).
Figure 5.3:
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effect. Figure 5.3
5.3 (middle)
(middle) shows e,
0. the coarsest measure,
measure. which represents the
its primary curtailing effect.
source. destination.
destination. and spoof
spoof address triples (a,
(a. t,
t , s)
fraction of source.
s) where a host residing at AS a is able to
I P packet to target AS t with spoofed source IP
I P address s.
send an IP
s. We observe that for coverage above
fract,ion of forgeable triplets shrinks to near O.
0. This means that if,
if. in addition to a and t,
t, the
20%. the fraction
20%,
spoof address s is randomly generated,
generated. then the spoofed IP
I P packet has almost zero chance of reaching
its target. Figure 5.3
Q 2 ( r ) as a function of
o f 'T.r . For an uncertainty factor of T
r == 20,
20, the
5.3 (right)
(right) shows \fJ2(T)

traceable-i.e.. to within Tr sites-IP
sites-IP addresses
addresses is nearly 1.
1. Collectively,
Collectively, these results show
fraction of traceable-i.e.,
that the attacker's effort, resources, and sophistication needed to launch a successful DDoS attack is
significant and brought about by route-based DPF's proactive filtering effect.

5.3
5.3

Reactive Filtering Effect: IP Traceback

I P flows
flows is an unrealistic goal given its
As shown in the previous section, eliminating all spoofable IP
connectivity. A different consequence of proactive filfilintrinsic difficulty with respect to Internet AS connectivity.
subtle. complementary effect where spoofed IP
I P flows
flows that cannot be prevented from
tering is the more subtle,
aflected by DPF
DPF
penetrating the network system can be localized to within a few possible sites. This is affected
filtering sufficiently many flows
flows such that the remaining spoofable IP
I P flows
flows form a sparse subset which,
which,

i.e.. IP
I P traceback.
traceback.
turn, facilitates source identification, i.e.,
in turn,
Figure 5.4
(T) as a function of T
R == loose,
Q1(7)
r for R
loose. tight, and T
T == VC,
VC. Rnd30,
Rnd30. Rnd50.
R.nd50. The
5.4 shows \fJ]

Q1(r)
transition
r value,
value, especially for T
T=
= VC
general trend shows that \fJ]
(T) undergoes a sharp transi
tion at some T
and R
R == tight.
tight. Figure 5.5
5.5 (left)
(left) shows \fJ](T)
Q1(r) for 1997-1999
1997-1999 Internet AS topologies for 1

<
< Tr << 10.
10.
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Q 1(T)
( r ) for R
= loose. Right:
Right: \fJ]
Q l (T)
( r ) for R
= tight.
5.4: 1997
1997 Internet AS topology. Left:
Left: \fJ]
Figure 5.4:
R =
R =
We observe that across 1997,
(5) is preserved-i.e.,
preserved-i.e., every attack can
1997, 1998,
1998, and 1999,
1999, \fJ]
Q1(5)
call be localized
to within 5 candidate sites-and
sites-and the only performance difference occurs for T
r

< 5 where \fJ]
Q1(T)
(7) < 1.
1.

I P traceback is achieved "instantly" and thus allows speedy on-line response by the attacked site with
IP
respect to actions against the perpetrating attack site.
packet marking,
Cornpared to probabilistic pa.cket
site. Compared

t,raceback since a single spoofed IP
I P packet
D P F is proactive even with respect to IP
I P traceback
route-based DPF
sinall constant number of locations. In PPM,
PPNI, a
suffices to reveal the attacker's AS location to within a small
sufficient number of DoS attack packets must be received before the attack
a.ttack path can
call be reconstructed by

[20, 23].
231. Thus,
Thus, not only can route-based
I P datagram [20,
the probabilistically
probabilistically inscribed link values in the IP
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5.5: Left: 'h
Ql (7)
(7) for 1997-1999
1997-1999 Internet AS topologies. Right: Shape of 'h
Ql (7)
(7) for ITI
IT1 =
= c ·!VCI
. JVCI
Figure 5.5:
= 1,2,
1 , 2 ,...
. . . ,5.
,5.
with dilation factor c =

DPF
I P traceback prowess of PPM,
P P M , it can do so more efficiently
efficient,ly and speedily than PPM.
PPM.
D P F emulate the IP
Figure 5.5
T after achieving
5.5 (right)
(right) shows the marginal benefit of increasing the number of nodes in T

T ==VC.
t,he vertex cover as represented
represe~ltedby the dilation factor
T
YC. We observe that increasing the size of the
= ITI/!VCI
ITIIIVCI has only an incremental effect.
effect. This shows that much of the IP
I P traceback effect is attained
c=

at the smaller vertex cover size (18.9%)
(18.9%) which facilitates
facilitates economy of coverage and deployment.
deployment.

5.4

Maximal Filters vs. Semi-maximal Filters

All the results reported in this paper are,
are. by default, based on semi-maximal filters.
filters. To ascertain the

potential performance loss due to not using maximal filters,
filters, we compare filtering performance with
Ql (7) and 1>2(1).
cP2(l). Figure 5.6
5.6 (left)
(left) shows 'h(7)
Ql (7) for 1997
1997 Internet
Int,erilet AS topology as a function
respect to 'h(7)
of

7T

when performing route-based DPF
D P F with maximal versus semi-maximal filters under R =
= tight

and T
T being YC.
VC. We observe that the performance difference in IP
I P traceback capability as captured

Q1(r)
example. for 7T =
= 5,
5. there is no performance difference.
difference. Figure 5.6
5.6 (right)
(right)
by 'h
(7) is minimal. For example,
compares 1>2(1)
cP2(l)for maximal and semi-maximal filters which, in fact,
fact, are equal.
equal. Thus the marginal

performance difference coupled with space efficiency warrants the use of semi-maximal filters
filters when
implementing route-based DPF.
I

I

1
0.9
0.8

u.~

07/ /

'I"

06//

Y1

F20.S
0.4

Il.~

0.3
0.2
0.1

o
Maximal
Maximal

Semi-maximal

5.6: 1997
1997 Internet AS topology.
topology. Left:
Left: Comparison of 'h
Q1(r)
Figure 5.6:
(7) for maximal and semi-maximal
filters.
comparisoil of 1>2(1)
cP2(l)for maximal and semi-maximal filters.
filters.
filters. Right: Corresponding comparison
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Impact of Network Topology

5.5
5.5.1
5.5.1

Internet AS Topology

Figure 5.7
5.7 shows the vertex cover sizes (expressed as a percentage) and W
q 11 ((5)
5 ) values for 1997-1999
1997-1999

IVClln-as
q l ((5)
5 ) and <P2
a2(l)-remain
Internet AS topologies. We observe that IVCI
/ n-as well as WI
(1 )-remain invariant over
1997-1999. In the rest of this section we focus
Q1(7) and discuss the results for <P2(l)
a 2 ( 1 ) when their
focus on W1(T)

performance is qualitatively different.
different. The size of the vertex cover plays an important role as an
Y1
F2

G-

'"
Il!

IVC'f!n .....------+----~
IWi

J':'W

5.7: Vertex cover size IVCI/n
IVCl/n and Wl(5),
Q1(5): <P2(1)
Q2(1) for 1997-1999
1997-1999 Internet AS topologies.
topologies
Figure 5.7:
fact, the smaller the VC, the better
intermediate indicator and facilitator of filtering performance. In fact,
ratio-note that 'Y
y == IVCI/n-which
IVClln-which indicates
the filtering performance in spite of the small coverage ratio-note
that the VC property and its relative size is a useful indicator of connectivity property relevant to DPF
DPF

performance.
5.5.2

Random Topology

We generate p-random graphs by connecting two nodes with link probability p. For a given Internet

fi

= n(~~l) where e =
= lEI.
El. The
graph, we generate its corresponding random graph by setting p =
AS graph,

1997-1999 Internet AS topologies are shown in Figure 5.8
5.8 (left).
(left). The two
specification and p values for 1997-1999
families of graphs differ only
oilly in their connectivity pattern. Figure 5.8
5.8 (middle)
(middle) shows vertex cover size
of the generated random graphs and corresponding Internet AS topologies.
topologies. On average,
average, the VC sizes of
R:llIdn1\l(h.:nrnt~m,·1
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0.001151
0.000942
0.000780

c

,,

r=O.OOI151 /
0,('

06

/p=OH~)942

Y1

Q

0.'

0'

0"""

o
o
o

:' r=(l.!HIOi~O
.

...

f~~ooel:800008£}1:1

~

.~/iiJ"
()lX~\~

()(~I~

(l,(U~

oml

01'011

omn

~

10

I~

W

~

~

~~

JO

~

~)

t

Figure 5.8:
5.8: Left: Link probabilities for random graphs corresponding to 1997-1999
1997-1999 Internet AS topolo-

IVClIn as a function of p and comparison with Internet AS. Right: \lidy)
Q1(7) plot.
gies. Middle: IVCI/n
gies.
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2.5 larger than their Internet AS counterparts. Figure 5.8
5.8 (right)
(right) shows WdT)
Q1(r)
the random graphs are 2.5
fuilction of Tr for different topologies.
topologies. In
I11 spite of engaging more nodes when performing filtering,
filt,ering.
as a function
the perforn~ance
performance as captured by W
d T) is significantly less than that ofInternet
Q1(r)
of Internet AS topology. Moreover,
Nloreover.
the perforinailce
performance difference amplifies as the size of the graph increases. Recall that the performance

1997-1999 Internet AS topologies (see
(see Figure 5.5
5.5 (left))
(left)) stayed invariant.
invariant,.
values for 1997-1999
5.5.3
5.5.3

Inet Topology Generator

We use Inet 2.0 [12]4,
[12]< a network topology generator,
generator, for generating artificial topologies closer to the Internet in their connectivity structure than random graphs.
graphs. Inet is designed to generate graph topologies

structure. Figure 5.9
5.9 (left)
(left)
with connectivity properties similar to Internet AS in terms of power-law structure.
shows the VC sizes of Inet generated graphs and their Internet AS counterparts for 1997-1999. We

50% larger than corresponding Internet AS graphs.
graphs.
observe that the VC sizes of Inet graphs are about 50%
Q 1 ( r ) as a function of Tr for Inet,
Inet? Internet AS, and random graphs.
graphs. We
5.9 (middle)
(middle) shows Wl(T)
Figure 5.9
observe, as expected,
expected. that filtering performance for Inet graphs is closer to that of Internet AS than
observe,
graphs.
random graphs.
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Figure 5.9:
I\/liddle: Comparison
5.9: Left:
Left: VC sizes for Inet graphs and corresponding Internet AS graphs.
graphs. Middle:

Q1(r)
graphs. Right:
Right: Performance difference between
of WI
(T) of Inet graph with Internet AS and random graphs.
size: Wl(5)/(IVCI/n).
Q1(5)/(IVCl/n).
Inet and Internet AS graphs normalized by VC size:
(right,) shows normalized filtering performance Tl(r)
= \[IdT)!T
Q l ( r ) / y for Tr = 5 where the
Figure 5.9 (right)
\[IdT) =
Q 1(1)
(l) =
=1
1 if T
T=
=V
V no matter what the structure
relative size of the filter set is incorporated. Since \[II
(relative to
t,o IVI)
IVI) which is
topology, TI
of the underlying topology,
WI measures filtering performance per filter node (relative
a more accurate
accurat,e metric for comparative evaluation. Figure 5.9 (right)
(right) shows that there is significant
difference in DPF
D P F performance between Inet and Internet AS topologies stemming,
stemming, in part, from VC
size difference. Inet is a topology generator whose primary feature is that of emulating power-law

[6]. The fact that the well-known VC graph property
relations for vertex degrees as observed in [6].
exhibits nontrivial gaps between Internet AS and Inet
Iilet topologies indicates that more refined structure
-1\Ve
benchmark graphs gellerated
Inet2.1~it was conveyed
' W e also tested with
wit11 berlchrnark
gelierated by Inet2.1-it
corlveyed to us recently that Inet2.0
Ir1et2.0 had a bug

w11e11generating
gerleratirlg large graphs of size 30K~with
30K-with similar
sin~ilarresults. The Inet2.1
Irlet2.1 graphs resulted in
irl a marginally
~nargirlallysmaller
s r ~ ~ a l l VC
\'C
er
whell
tllan 2%
2% difference~for
differe~~ce-for graph sizes correspollding
correspolldirlg to 1997-1999 Internet
111ternet AS topologies.
size---less than
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5.10: Left:
Left: Comparison of <P2(1)
Q2(1) for Inet and 1997-1999 Internet AS topologies. Right: CorreFigure 5.10:

G2 (1) == <P2(1)!J.
Q2( l ) / y .
normalized <h(l)
sponding comparison of normaliz;ed
may need to be uncovered within the family of power-law graphs to accurately capture the Internet's
topological properties.

Q2(1) for Inet and 1997-1999 Internet AS topologies.
t,opologies. As
(left) shows a comparison of <P2(1)
Figure 5.10 (left)
Q1 (7). we observe a persistent gap in reactive filtering performance which is consistent with the
with \h(T),

size. Figure 5.10
5.10 (right)
(right) shows normalized IP
I P traceback performance
corresponding gap in the VC size.
-

Q2(1) =
= <P2(1)!J
Q 2 ( l ) l y for the same benchmark set-up which incorporates the size of the filter net in the
(1)2(1)
furt,her amplified.
performance measure. As expected,
expected. performance difference is further
5.5.4
5.5.4

Brite
B r i t e Topology Generator
Generator

1141 is a network topology generator that, in addition to capturing power-Jaw
power-jaw connectivity strucBrite [14]
ture. seeks to inject spatial proximity in the constructive process. Brite specifies seven parameters: size
ture.
(LS): number of nodes (n),
( n ) , number of edges added for each new
(I-IS), size of lower plane (LS),
of higher plane (HS),
node (m),
5 (PC),
incremeiltal growth (IG).
(IG). When
(in), node placement (NP),
(NP), preferential connectivity
connectivity5
(PC), and incremental
dj ((3L),
PC=O, a new node is connected to node ii with Waxman's probability density [32],
Pi =
[32], pi
= OiC
ae-dl(pL).

< 1,1, d is the Euclidean distance between two nodes,
nodes, and L
::::
L is the maximum distance
PC=1, a new node connects to node ii with probability I
between any two nodes. When PC=l,
l:?
d;-d where

a , fJp
where 0 < Oi,

Cj€C'
jEe d~
J

C is the set of candidate neighbor nodes. With PC=2, the probability of
dd,i is the degree of node ii and C
connecting to node ii is given by l:

,ptdb

p,d'd'.

JjEe
E C PJ3 J3

PC=O considers spatial proximity only,
only. PC=l
PC=1 focuses
Thus PC=O

on power-law structure as captured by node degree distribution, and PC=2 is a hybrid.
Using HS=1000,
I-IS=1000, LS=lO,
LS=10, IG=L
I G = l . and n=3015, test graphs were generated with the three PC
P C options.
options.
The specification and results for VC size are shown in Figure 5.11
5.11 (left).
(left). Figure 5.11
5.11 (middle)
(middle) and

(right) show the performance effects with respect to \If
Q 11(T)
( r ) and <P2
a 2 ((1),
1 ) , respectively.
respectively. When PC=O,
PC=O.
(right)
generated-in addition to not being power-law-has
(3.6%).
we observe that the graph generated-in
power-law-has too small VC (3.6%).
Q 1 ( r ) and <P2(1)
a 2 ( 1 ) is closer than that of PC=l
PC=1 and 2,
2. however,
however. the
Its performance with respect to \IfdT)
a 2 ( 1 ) is significant,
significant,. being worse
performance gap from the corresponding Internet AS topology for <P2(1)
5The
5 ~ 1 1 eBrite generator [14]
[14] had a small
s~rlallbug with
wit11 respect to option PC=2
PC=2 which was fixed.
fixed
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5.11: Left: VC sizes for Brite graphs with PC=O,
PC=O. 1.
1. and 2. Middle:
Middle: \h(7)
Q l ( r ) as a function of 7r
Figure 5.11:
1. and 2. Right: Corresponding <r?2(1)
cPz(l)plot.
for PC=O, 1,
PC=1 and 2,
2. the VC sizes are too large,
large. and performance for both
than that of the Inet generator. For PC=l
Q l ( r ) and <r?2(1)
Q2(1) significantly worse than Internet AS (and
(and Inet).
Inet). We have tried the Brite generator
\Jh(7)
,get,ting topologies that resemble Internet
with other parameter specifications but were unsuccessful in getting
AS both from the VC size and filtering performance perspectives. VI/e
We have also tried extending option

+

q ,+ (1
(1 -- ex)
c Lr d,) dL to inject both spatial and degree sensitivity
sensit,ivity in a
PC=2 by using the weighting exPi

CjEC
, E CJ . ~ J

cr increases Ivq
lVCl monotonically
monot,onically decreases,
decreases. and for ex
cr =
= 0.13
0.13 the VC size
more controlled fashion. As ex
Q1(7)
(7) close to its Internet AS value. However,
However. the
can be approximated to that of Internet AS with w]
Q z ( l ) performance is dismal (about 20%)
20%) when compared to Internet AS.
corresponding <r?2(1)
5.5.5
5.5.5

Rank-based
Rank-based Filter Placement

Figure 5.12
filt~r placement for a range of coverage ratios.
5.12 shows filtering performance of rank-based filter

filt,ering which has coverage ratio 'Y
y=
= 0.189,
0.189. we observe that both W]
Ql (7)
(7) and
Compared to VC-based filtering
<r?2(1)
performance even when their coverage ratio is higher,
Q2(1) show diminished performalice
higher. Note that the greedy
algorithm for vertex cover selects vertices that are able to cover the maximum number of remaining
edges which is not the same as picking maximum degree nodes.
nodes. The performance gap indicates that
selection of high degree vertices as filtering sites is an important-but
important-but not the only--effect
only---- effect of VC-based
filter selection on DPF
D P F performance in Internet AS topology. Indeed, rank-based filter placement can
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Figure 5.12:
5.12: 1997
1997 Internet AS topology. Left:
Left: Comparison
Con~parisonof W]
Q1(7)
(7) for rank-based filter placement

y=
= 0.20,0.25,0.30,0.35
0.20.0.25,0.30.0.35 versus VC-based T.
T. Right: Corresponding comparison for <r?2(1).
Qz(l).
with 'Y
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lead to
that are incident on edges that are already covered.
to inefficiencies by selecting high-degree nodes t.hat
This
NP-hard problems.
problem 6 .
This suggests that optimal filter
filter placement
placement, may be an NP-hard

5.6
5.6

Ingress
Ingress Filtering

Section 4.5
4.5 showed that ingress filtering is not a viable strategy
st,rategy for achieving proactive and reactive
filtering
represent "trusted" domains
Sirice AS belonging to T represent
filtering performance for
for DDoS attack prevention. Since
where route-based DPF
routers, ingress filtering was assumed
executcd at
a t its border routers.
D P F is
is guaranteed to be executed
to
in T implement
implement routeT. It is.
is. however,
however. conceivable that AS i11
to be carried out by AS
AS belonging to T.
based DPF
D P F but do
do not assure ingress filtering. That is,
is. they seek to protect themselves from external
DoS
targeted at
DoS attack flows
flows while allowing DoS attacks to occur within their domain including those targeted
other domains.
performance when AS in T perform
domains. Figure 5.13
5.13 shows
shows proactive and reactive filtering performance
route-based DPF
5.13 (left)
(left) shows Q1
\I1dT)
1997-1999
filt,ering. Figure 5.13
( r ) for 1997-1999
D P F but do
do not perform ingress filtering.
Internet AS
performance penalty such that Q1(5)
\11 1 (5) #
=I- 1.
1. On
AS topologies.
topologies. We observe that there is a perforinance
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5.13: Route-based
R.oute-based DPF
D P F without"
without'ingress
filtering. Left: Q
( r ) as a function of
Figure 5.13:
ingress filtering.
\11 11(T)
of rT for 1997-1999
1997-1999
AS topologies.
topologies. Right:
Right: Corresponding <1>2(1)
a 2 ( 1 ) values.
Internet AS
values.
hand. \11
Q1(20)
= 1 for all three
t,hree years.
years. That is.
P traceback can localize the attack site
the other hand,
1 (20) =
is, IIP
5-the number achievable with ingress filtering-however,
to within 20
20 locations.
locations. This is worse than 5-the
to
filtering-however,
3000-5000 autonomous systems during 1997-1999.
considering that there were in the range 3000-5000
1997-1999, 20 is still a
2 ((1)
1 ) values.
small constant,
constant, and thus managable number.
number. Figure 5.13 (right)
small
(right) shows the corresponding a<1>2
a 2 (1)
( 1 ) drops
drops from
from around 90%
90% to 70%
70% which is still significantly higher than the 20% proactive effect
<1>2
achievable with ingress
ingress filtering
filtering alone.
alone. Interestingly,
Interestingly. the performance gap of
achievable
of 20% roughly corresponds
= ITI/n
ITl/n for VC
V C in the Internet AS topologies.
to the coverage ratio Iy =
to
topologies.

5.7
5.7

Multi-path Routing

If multiple paths are
are permitted when routing packets
packet.^ from
froin source to destination.
If
destination. the more easily packets
elude route-based filtering when using spoofed source IIP
P addresses. Figure 5.14 shows the impact
can elude
filtering performance. Figure 5.14 (left)
of multi-path routing on filtering
(left) and (middle)
(middle) show that traceback
traceback
"his is
is an
an interesting
i~lterestillgproblem
problerrl to explore in future
future work.
wol-k. Generally,
Gellerally, it ruay
o illvestigate
6This
may be fruitful tto
inve~tigate whether
whether network
allocatio~lproblems
problelrls can be more
lrlore accurately solved--NP-hardness
sol\,ed--NP-llard~~ess
will re1nai11-for
allocation
remain-for a fa111ily
family of
of power-lam
power-law graphs.

resource
re~OUITe
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capability as captured by W]
Q1(T)
( 7 ) decreases gradually as the number of multi-paths allowed is increased.
A similar result holds for <1>2(1)
cD2(1) and is shown in Figure 5.14
5.14 (right).
(right). Collectively,
Collectively, these performance

coininoil phenomenon in Internet AS topologies than in
plots show that presence ofmulti-paths--a
of mult,i-paths--a more common
topologies-has a graded effect and does not significantly impact the effectiveness
effectiveness ofroute-based
of route-based
router topologies-has
DPF.
I
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5.14: Effect of multi-path
multi-pat,]] routing
rout,ing for 1997
1997 Internet AS topology. Left:
Left: Wl(T).
Q1(7). Middle: DisFigure 5.14:
tribution of wd5)
Q1(5) and Wl(10)
Q1(lO) over the number of multi-paths.
multi-paths. Right:
Right: <1>2(1)
a 2 ( 1 ) for R from tight to
loose.
loose.

6

Conclusion

We have described a proact,ive/reactive
V\!e
proactive/reactive approach to distributed DoS attack prevention based on routebased distributed packet filtering.
filtering. Vie
We have shown route-based DPF's efficacy at proactively curtailing
I P flows
flows from reaching their intended targets, including the drastically reduced Internet AS sites
spoofed IP
proactivity-no spoofed IP
from which such attacks can be launched. We have shown that perfect proactivity-no
I P flow
flow
can penetrate-is
penetrate-is intrinsically difficult to achieve in Internet AS topologies while maintaining sparse

(e.g.: 20% or less AS sites deploying route-based DPF)
DPF) coverage.
coverage. However, this is mitigated by the
(e.g.,
I P flows
flows that can penetrate the filter net can be localized to within 5 candidate
fact that those spoofed IP
traceback. Compared to probabilistic packet marking, we have shown
I P traceback,
sites which facilitates efficient IP
that route-based DPF
(see Section 2).
2). We have also
D P F is able to solve PPM's three key weaknesses (see
shown that the filtering effect achieved by route-based DPF
D P F is sensitive to the underlying Internet AS
connectivity structure.
particular, we have shown that power-law structure of Internet AS topology
structure. In part,icular.

facilitatirig proactive/reactive
filtering. Finding efficient implementations
plays an important role in facilitating
proactive/reactive filtering.
for computing semi-maximal filters
filters and evaluating the costs associated with deployment and router

vis-2-vis the performalice
D P F is a major challenge and a task for
overhead vis-a-vis
performance benefits of route-based DPF
future work.
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